On prisoners' right to vote

"The Court accepts that this is an area in which a wide margin of appreciation should be granted to the national legislature in determining whether restrictions on prisoners’ right to vote can still be justified in modern times and if so how a fair balance is to be struck. … It cannot accept however that an absolute bar on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstances falls within an acceptable margin of appreciation." 

The above is an extract from the judgement of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on the case Hirst v UK.  I quote it because it clearly shows the amount of legislative sovereignty that we have transferred to a supranational authority.  The Court kindly grants us a "wide margin of appreciation", whilst they define what that margin is - lucky us.



Prisoners have been convicted of an offence serious enough to warrant the withholding of their right to liberty in to punish.  Obviously, the restriction of this fundamental right does not mean that any other fundamental rights (that is, rights that are equal to or greater than the right to liberty) are restricted.


The problem is that the right to vote is not greater than, nor is it equal to, the right to liberty, as it is not a human or fundamental right (the terms are interchangeable).  A fundamental right is a right that we hold purely as a result of our existence, which include the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  The right to vote does not meet this criterion.


In allowing convicted prisoners the right to vote, the fundamentality of our right to liberty is grievously compromised.  To allow a non-fundamental right to people who are being legitimately denied a fundamental right implies that the non-fundamental right is, in importance, equal to or greater than the fundamental right.  This cannot be, due to its non-fundamentality.  Otherwise, the status of the right to vote is exaggerated and the status of the right to liberty is underrated.  Therefore, convicted prisoners must be denied the right to vote, despite the threats of the European judiciary.


Parliament is still sovereign in theory, but politically, that sovereignty is dwindling.  We must refuse to extend the vote to convicted prisoners, refuse to pay compensation, and force the courts of England and Wales to decide, once and for all, between unelected judges in Europe or elected representatives of the people in the United Kingdom.